Brooke, Edward W. "An Appeal to Hanoi." Congressional Record, 90th Congress,
Second Session, June 18, 1968.
Insert abstract here....
 FULL TEXT
SPEECH
OF
HON. EDWARD W. BROOKE
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 1968
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak as soberly and carefully
as I can about the current situation in Vietnam and the negotiations in Paris. In doing
so I am well aware that I am breaking the silence which most us in this body have adopted
in recent weeks, a silence reflecting a responsible concern not to jeopardize the vital
effort substitute diplomacy for warfare in Southeast Asia. We have prayed that by
withholding comment on the war during this crucial period we might facilitate the progress
of the peace discussions.
Unfortunately, it appears that the North Vietnamese have misconstrued our silence, just as
they seem to have misjudged the earnest overtures for a peaceful settlement made by our
President. They have responded America's unilateral deescalation of the war by rapidly
increasing their own military efforts. They have punctuated the talks in Paris with
intensified terror attacks in Saigon. Apparently they have come to the conference table
with little disposition conduct serious negotiations at this time and with an intent use
diplomatic forum for propaganda.
In an outrageous denial of fact, the North Vietnamese even refuse acknowledge the
presence of their forces in South Vietnam. What is worse, Hanoi continues to operate
under the illusion that its bargaining position can be improved by calculated acts of
the utmost brutality against the civilian population of the South. In hopes of undermining
the Government of South Vietnam and of disrupting its relations with its principal ally,
the North Vietnamese regime is following its established doctrine of escalating war while
talking.
This policy was enunciated by Hanoi's Deputy Chief Staff, General Vinh, in a speech to
the fourth congress of the Vietcong:
We will take advantage of the opportunities offered by the negotiations to step up further
our military attacks. The decisive factor lies on the battlefield. In fighting while
negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept his
conditions.
The North Vietnamese compounding the tragedy of the war by a fundamental misunderstanding
of the relation between the terrorism which they are instigating in South Vietnam and
the willingness of the allies to seek a negotiated settlement. Contrary to the dogma
which prevails in Hanoi, a hundred nights of a hundred rockets in Saigon will not bring
concessions. Nothing could be more certain to harden the will of the South Vietnamese
Government and its allies, for there could be no more discouraging evidence of the character
their adversaries.
So far as the United States is concerned, I believe it is imperative that we disabuse the
North Vietnamese of their misguided notion that increased terror attacks will compel us
to accept their conditions for peace. As the Citizens Committee for Peace With Freedom
in Vietnam has stated:
One of the greatest threats to successful negotiations is that Hanoi may under-estimate
America's resolve.
I fear that this is exactly what is happening.
If the just peace for which we all yearn is come, Hanoi's misperception of our
determination must give way to an accurate appreciation of American purpose and will.
That purpose remains to assist the South Vietnamese in defending their right to determine
their own political order. That will remains sufficient to the task.
Beneath the long and noisy debate in this country, there is a bedrock solidarity to
American opinion on the war in Vietnam. It is essential for Hanoi to recognize that
Americans want a fair peace and that they will accept nothing less.
The American public will not give way before the horrors being perpetrated by the People's
Army of North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Precisely the opposite will occur. For example,
in the wake of the Tet offensive on the cities, Louis Harris reported that support for
the U.S. war effort had soared from 61 percent to 74 percent. A similar tendency is
fully predictable if the PAVIN and Vietcong persist in their current tactics. This is
the habitual response of the American people in time of trial. They will do what has to
be done.
Hanoi should not infer from the growing concern over our needs at home that we will
withdraw from necessary commitments abroad. Another recent Harris poll indicates that a
solid majority of Americans favor spending what is required in Vietnam.
This rockbottom sturdiness in American opinion is the political reality with which Hanoi
must reckon. Should Ho Chi Minh still doubt that the United States has the will to bear
its burdens, he should pay particular attention to the tax increase which Congress has
already approved.
Hanoi should not delude itself into thinking that the start of negotiations has created
expectations in this country of an early settlement or that the United States has no
choice but to continue the talks, however fruitless they may prove. Quite the contrary
is true. The American people have adopted a highly skeptical attitude toward the Paris
discussions and are prepared for the contingency of their failure. In fact, polls reveal
that most Americans doubt that the talks will end the war, and a substantial majority
expect them to drag on for a long time. Moreover, while 88 percent of those surveyed
by Harris are strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement and 68 percent are prepared
to see a neutralist solution to the war, a firm majority are opposed to the imposition
of any coalition regime on South Vietnam.
What this means me, and what I think it should mean to Hanoi, is that the American public
is fully prepared to seek a compromise settlement in which all South Vietnamese, including
those presently members of the NLF, will have an opportunity to take part in the political
life of their country. But there is no inclination to reward force by guaranteeing the
National Liberation Front a political role which it has not won through political
processes.
The new Cabinet in Saigon gives the South Vietnamese Government its widest popular base to
date, collectively representing more than half the total votes in the recent national
elections. Premier Tran Van Huong has displayed his own enlightened view of the need
to end the war by discouraging talk reprisals against Hanoi for the bloody assaults Saigon.
He has noted, simply and compassionately, that the innocent people who die in any such
retaliatory attacks are also Vietnamese. The question is "Where is the leader in
Hanoi who will voice the same humane attitude toward the innocent civilians under attack
in Saigon?"
If the North Vietnamese are actually intent upon peace in the region, they should be
looking toward direct discussions with Saigon. The fundamental question, obviously,
will have to be the role of the National Liberation Front in the future Government of
South Vietnam. For my part, I believe there is a reasonable basis for including the
members and adherents of the Front in the political processes of the South. That basis
is the principle of one man, one vote, a principle which can be implemented through the
constitutional procedures already established in South Vietnam. This is the view of
the Citizens Committee for Peace With Freedom in Vietnam, a distinguished group of
Americans founded by our respected former colleague, Senator Paul Douglas, and numbering
among its members both President Eisenhower and President Truman.
The committee has spoken for most Americans in its declaration that—
Any representation of the National Liberation Front in the political structure of South
Vietnam should occur as a result of a free political choice expressed by the South
Vietnamese themselves.
The electoral procedures of South Vietnam provide for all parties to be represented on
the boards which process the ballots, adequate arrangements exist, or can be designed, to
insure fair access to the voters for any candidates sponsored by the Front or its
sympathizers.
It is my considered judgment that, once the North Vietnamese and their associates in the
NLF give convincing evidence of their willingness to move toward serious negotiations,
the Government of South Vietnam should make clear that it is prepared to accept the NLF
or a successor organization into the political life of the country. The exact terms of
their participation may well be the subject of protracted discussions, but those are the
discussions which should be undertaken as soon as possible.
The people of the United States and of most other countries have taken President Johnson's
unilateral deescalatiou and peace initiative as a genuine and far-reaching step toward
political settlement of the war. In return it is assumed that the North Vietnamese will
themselves demonstrate a sincere willingness to reach an agreement. So far, in more than
a month of talks, they have failed to do so. Should they continue in their present course,
the consequences could be extremely grave.
Neither we nor our adversaries should lightly countenance a collapse of the negotiations.
If this occurs, the invaluable channels of diplomacy could be discredited for years to
come and both the allies and the North Vietnamese could face a longer and more horrible
war. Given present moods and trends, such a development could only confirm suspicions
that Hanoi is seeking to exploit negotiations for propaganda advantage rather than an
honest peace. It will reinforce the painful experience of the Laos accord of 1962,
an accord which the North Vietnamese have violated from the beginning. Indeed, as
Prince Souvanna Phouma has recently disclosed, Hanoi already had troops in Laos at
the time of the 1962 agreement, and assured the Prince that they would be removed if
he did not make an issue of their presence at Geneva. Yet large numbers of North
Vietnamese are still in Laos today. The knowledge that North Vietnam has reneged on
its private bargains as well as its public ones is not designed to enhance mutual trust.
It is bound to make the Paris discussions more difficult, and if they are terminated
became of North Vietnam's total disregard for their serious purpose, to make their
resumption less likely.
An outcome of this sort in Paris is bound to weaken the influence of those of us in
the United States who have long favored a negotiated end to hostilities. James Reston
is certainly right in noting that the callous behavior of the North Vietnamese to date
is "not only breaking the spirit of accommodation and adding greatly to the
bloodshed, but hardening the American negotiating position, which is precisely the
opposite of what Hanoi intended." It threatens to discredit future arguments that
America should take the first steps to moderate the war, in the expectation that North
Vietnam would reciprocate.
Mr. President, it is my sad conviction that we are in one of the most dangerous and
precarious period of the entire war. Should negotiations fail, I fear that there will
be tremendous pressure on the U.S. Government, both from its electorate and its allies,
to resume escalation. There are likely to be not only calls for the bombing limitations
to end, but also overwhelming demands for an all-out assault to close Haiphong. Under
some circumstances, a frustrated and impatient public might even insist on such harsh
measures as strikes against the dikes in North Vietnam, an action which would be a
radical and lamentable departure from America's consistent effort to limit the conflict.
Already I am hearing from colleagues and constituents vehement arguments that every
rocket that falls on Saigon should be matched by a bomb on Hanoi.
Of even greater danger to world peace would be the possibility of a wider, as well as
a more intense, war. In some quarters there may arise new proposals for interdicting
the Ho Chi Minh trail by sending ground troops into Laos. The occupation of the
demilitarized zone might become a real issue. And I am deeply apprehensive that the
scare stories one has heard so often about an impending invasion of the North might
cause to mere fantasy. With the growing capacity of the Army of South Vietnam, there may
even be those who will urge Saigon to establish a beachhead above the DMZ with U.S.
naval and air support.
Should these contingencies develop in the aftermath of a debacle in Paris, both the Allies
and the North Vietnamese would be dealing with a vastly altered military and political
situation. Hanoi must know that, having sent 100,000 of its best troops south, North
Vietnam is in several respects more vulnerable to a renewed war above the 17th parallel.
Moreover, it now has at stake in the South a greater investment of men and materiel
than ever before. Northern troops now comprise the bulk of the main force units in
South Vietnam, and Northerners are serving as "fillers" for badly depleted
Vietcong units which cannot sustain their former rate of recruitment in the South. Thus,
resumption of even fiercer warfare in the North and South must be judged, by any rational
assessment, a costly prospect for all parties.
If Hanoi is to make a balanced appraisal of the negotiations in Paris, it must understand
some central truths about the domestic political trends in the United States. The present
administration is ready and willing to get on with the hard business of negotiating an
equitable peace in Vietnam. In this effort it has the general support of the American people.
It has the general support of Congress. No successor administration will be prepared to
accept an inequitable peace, with a fresh mandate it will be capable of prolonged
negotiations, if necessary. In short there is nothing for North Vietnam to gain by
procrastination, and much for it to lose.
By making the personal and political sacrifice announced in his speech of March 31,
President Johnson has effectively neutralized the political constraints under which
American leaders normally function. He has gained unprecedented freedom of maneuver and
has sought to use it in the interests of peace. But make no mistake about it, the
President's options do not lead only to the conference table. He is still Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
No President could have stronger incentive than Lyndon Baines Johnson to conclude the war
in Vietnam. No moment will be more opportune for Hanoi to negotiate than now.
Mr. President, Hanoi's present strategy can prolong the war. It cannot bring peace.
Without a reasonable measure of reciprocity by North Vietnam, it is difficult to conceive
of further concessions by the allies.
The people of Vietnam, the people of America, and, indeed, the people of all the world,
want peace. They need peace. They deserve peace. The decision rests with Hanoi.
|
